Our Martyrs / ስዉኣትና

Eritrea’s government building in Asmara.

This is the fifth part of The Thin Red Line, an African Arguments series focusing on dynamics around the Red Sea.

Over the past few years, alliances and rivalries across the Horn of Africa have shifted significantly. This is perhaps nowhere clearer than in Eritrea, which has embodied the truism that counties have no permanent friends or permanent enemies, but only permanent interests.

Recently, those interests have led Asmara to make peace with Ethiopia after twenty years and improve its relations with others in the region. These breakthroughs have led to hopes that the government may soon enact long overdue reforms at home. After all, for two decades, its oppressive behaviour and economic woes have been blamed on hostility with Ethiopia and living a “bad neighbourhood”.

A closer look at the factors leading to Eritrea’s changing relations, however, dampen these expectations.

Eritrea’s changing allegiances

In the first few years of independence in the 1990s, Eritrea built its foreign ties on principles and loyalties. Though not always completely consistent, it shunned governments that had supported its rival liberation movement as well as monarchies or Islamist regimes deemed to be a threat.

Following the 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia, these determinations quickly shifted. Tensions with neighbours Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan ratcheted up, while relations with the West took a turn for the worse. Under this growing international isolation and domestic pressure, foreign relations became more pragmatic. The goal became, first and foremost, about regime survival.

President Isaias Afwerki thus looked to cut deals with a range of other powers looking to extend their influence in the region. These partnerships range from China and Russia to Israel, Iran and Libya. From the mid-2000s, however, Qatar became particularly crucial to the maintenance of Afwerki’s increasingly repressive rule. The small Gulf nation provided essential and extensive financial and military assistance and became the Horn of Africa country’s most important economic partner.

In the early-2010s, this close relationship started to fray. Afwerki was reportedly angered by Qatar’s attempts to tame his recalcitrant behaviour and break Asmara’s long-running impasse with Ethiopia. He was additionally alarmed at the Gulf nation’s catalysing role in popular uprisings in the 2011 Arab Spring.

Eritrea therefore took the opportunity of increasing interest from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to shift its alliances. In 2015, it signed a security partnership agreement allowing the UAE to build a military base in Assab for its war-effort in Yemen. Afwerki’s new allies agreed to provide significant financial aid, build infrastructure in Eritrea, and increase fuel supplies to the country. Eritrea provided land, airspace and also reportedly deployed around 400 of its own troops to Yemen.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE quickly became essential partners as Eritrea switched allegiances. The extent of this change was clear in the 2017 Gulf crisis when the government threw its weight behind the Saudi-led camp in its attempts to isolate Qatar.

In the last couple of years, Asmara has also given the cold shoulder to this bloc’s regional rivals. It has cut off military and diplomatic relations with Iran, whose nuclear programme Afwerki had publicly defended in 2009, and snubbed Turkey in its attempts to extend its influence in the Horn. At the same time, Afwerki has visited Egypt, an affiliate of the Arab axis, on several occasions and supported Cairo in its diplomatic row with Ethiopia and Sudan regarding the Nile waters.

Peace with Ethiopia

All these foreign policy changes have been significant for Eritrea. But perhaps the most momentous shift has been its rapprochement with Ethiopia after twenty years of hostility. Beginning this June, the two neighbours ended their long-standing stalemate and promised to open a new chapter of peace.

This understandably rocked the region. The conflict has cast a shadow over the Horn of Africa for two decades. Ethiopia has used the dispute to encourage others to isolate Eritrea. Meanwhile, Afwerki has used Ethiopian hostility as a pretext for widespread prohibitions on freedoms, the banning of the free press, and the imposition of indefinite military service at home.

Following the announcement of peace, and Ethiopia’s calls for the UN to lift sanctions on its neighbour, it was understandable that many were excited an opening up of Eritrea might be in the offing.

However, there are reasons to be sceptical this change is coming.

Change abroad, change at home?

Firstly, this development is related to Eritrea’s broader relations across the Red Sea, and therefore the dynamics and interests these contain.

As documented in the Thin Red Line series, the Red Sea has regained its geopolitical significance recently with rival powers scrambling for strategic footprints on the sea’s western shores. Different competing blocs have built allegiances – bolstered by attractive economic deals – from Egypt down to Somalia, gaining leverage over many of their new partners. Some African countries, most notably Ethiopia, have been able to stay independent in the face of this attention, but others have struggled. Eritrea has clearly thrown in its lot with the Saudi bloc to which it is reliant and indebted.

These patrons, however, have little interest in Eritrea undergoing reforms, which might risk its internal instability. After all, the Gulf’s engagement is not based on principles but self-interest. For various reasons, a rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Asmara was deemed to serve these interests; Emirati leaders notably met with Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Afwerki on several occasions in the run-up to the announcement of peace. But democratisation in Eritrea is unlikely to. In fact, the opposite may be true.

In this way, Eritrea and Ethiopia’s peace can be seen as part of wider Red Sea dynamics, rivalries and interests being projected onto the Horn, which are more likely to raise tensions in an already volatile region than encourage democratisation.

Secondly, the reality is that as long as Afwerki remains at the helm, it is difficult to see genuine reforms happening. For a whole generation, the president has suspended Eritrea’s democratisation and cracked down on any dissenters in order to maintain his rule.

Former foreign minister Petros Solomon, a member of the G-15 opposition who disappeared in 2001, once claimed that Afwerki’s foreign policy was erratic and that the ministry’s main job was simply to do damage control. But this underplays the underlying logic of the president’s approach to foreign relations, which has mostly been about his own survival. Previously, hostility with Ethiopia served this purpose. Under new circumstances, Afwerki has deemed that a UAE-brokered peace is advantageous. But the ultimate motivation is the same.

Eritrea’s lucrative alliances with powers across the Red Sea may have precipitated some sweeping changes in its foreign policy, but they have also bolstered the president’s position domestically. In fact, rather than pushing for change, they have given him a new lifeline. Afwerki’s new partnerships have allowed him to avoid the economic and political liberalisation that Western donors or continued misery might have demanded, and they have fortified his security and military base against direct threats or internal demands for reforms.

Source=https://africanarguments.org/2018/09/12/eritrea-why-change-abroad-change-home/

Eritrean and Ethiopian commanders meet at Zalanbessa as defensive positions are removed ahead of New Year celebrations

Source: Human Rights Concern Eritrea

Eritrea: Hopes for Democratic Change and Reform of National Service?

Following the recent rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia dated 7 July 2018, a number of media commentators, diplomats and foreign government officials have expressed hope that the political situation in Eritrea would be normalised soon. Attention must be given to the system of arbitrary and indefinite national military service programme of the government of Eritrea.

The National Service programme is characterised by forced conscription, persistent human rights violations and slavery. It is the main reason behind Eritrean migrant exodus witnessed over the course of the last two decades. (See the findings of the UN Commission Of Inquiry).

The hope is that the programme would cease to be indefinite and that the period of service would be limited to 18 months. For Germany’s development minister, Gerd Mueller, who personally met President Isaias Afewerki on 24 August, his hopes go further and he predicts the introduction of “democratic structures” in Eritrea soon.

This far, there is no material evidence to justify the hopes expressed by media commentators and foreign government officials like Minister Gerd Mueller. Their hopes appear to be based merely on their personal encounters with Eritrean officials, or perhaps on the contents of the series of interviews made by Eritrean officials with international media outlets.

From long experience, Eritreans do not take statements made by Eritrean officials seriously, simply because of the constant inconsistencies and discrepancies between words and actions. Above all, the promises they make normally do not materialise.

Nevertheless, in so far as they appear to draw the attention of international media and foreign government officials, perhaps it is important to review the statements made by Eritrean officials over the course of the last four years.

Statements of Eritrean Officials

Concerning a transition to a constitutional governance in Eritrea, in May 2014, in an interview with local media, President Isaias Aferwerki announced the “death” of the 1997 constitution – a constitution that was ratified in 1997 but never implemented. Instead he promised the drafting of a brand-new constitution.

Two years later, in February 2016, a Presidential Adviser, Yemane Gebreab, informed the UN Commission of Inquiry that a committee was established to consider the drafting of a new constitution. Four years since this initial announcement, what happened to this “new” constitution? Or is there any “new” constitution at all?

With regard to the programme of national military service, in April 2015, in an interview with the Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialog, Yemane Gebreab stated that Eritrea would limit national service to 18 months, in line with the provisions of the 1995 decree. He also added that “the challenge is to be able to find jobs, skills, training and business opportunities when conscripts are released”, indicating that the problem is mostly an economic issue.

However, after one month, Yemane Gebreab’s assertions were contradicted by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ press statement released in June 2015, which made it clear that there are no plans to limit the period of National Service to 18 months, owing to Ethiopia’s refusal to abide by the decision of the Border Commission.

Similar assertions were made by the Information Minister, Yemane Gebremeskel, in February 2016, in an interview with Reuters in which he stated that there were no plans to limit national service, and that “demobilisation is predicated on removal of main threat”, that threat being Ethiopia’s refusal to withdraw its troops from Eritrean territories. In the same month, President Isaias made an announcement of salary increases to conscripts. It is important here to note the pattern – “we-will-limit, we-won’t-limit, and salary-increase”.

With peace declared between Eritrea and Ethiopia in July this year, similar statements are once again emerging from Eritrean officials, and following the same pattern observed in 2015/16.Immediately after President Isaias announced his impending visit to Ethiopia, it was reported that officials at Sawa military training camp informed new conscripts that National Service will be limited to 18 months. The news found its way to international media and produced some level of jubilation.

Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel was aware of the reports, and he stated that “an official announcement has not been made so far”, suggesting that such an announcement would be imminent.

Later in August, Yemane Gebremeskel told Bloomberg that “work on the constitution would begin soon”, indicating that whatever the President and his Adviser had said about a “new” constitution thus far had been nothing but another empty public relations exercise.

On 25 August 2018, the Eritrean Foreign Minister, Osman Saleh Mohammed, met with the German minster, Gerd Mueller. Mohammed appeared so emboldened that after the meeting with Minister Mueller, he held an interview with the Germany radio service (Deutsche Welle). In the interview, he blandly stated that his government was not the cause of the Eritrean migrant exodus, as if the national service decree has been implemented in Eritrea by the German government! Implicitly indicating that the political situation of Eritrea is back to normalcy (or national service is limited to 18 months), he also called for Eritrean migrants to come back home.

A new addition to the “discourse” (a discourse normally carried out by the president, the Minsters of Information and Foreign Affairs, and the presidential adviser) is the Minister of Labour and Human Welfare, Mrs. Luul Gebreab. On 2 September, Mrs. Gebreab told Bloomberg that Eritrea will cut its army numbers and that the remaining conscripts “will concentrate on developmental work”. Like the excuses presented by Yemane Gebreab in 2015, she also stated that the government is studying the “economic effects of demobilization”, i.e. issues concerning to availability of employment for conscripts.

At the same time, Yemane Gebremeskel asserted (also to Bloomberg)that at the moment there is no prospect of returning to “statutory” terms of 18 months national service. Instead he raised the matter of reviewing and considering salary increases for conscripts. It is important to note that conscripts are normally deployed (with no more than nominal pay) in every sector where labour is needed – be it in the army, construction companies or civilian administration.

Bloomberg has learned that Eritrean officials maintain the position that “demobilisation depends on Ethiopia concluding its parts of the peace deal and withdrawing its troops from Eritrean territories”. This means that conscripts will not be free until such time as Ethiopia acts in a specific way. In this way, the officials are determined to convince everyone that the “Ethiopian threat” persists. With the issue of “salary increases” again raised, the repeated pattern of delay and excuse becomes complete.

The National Service: what is it?

For nearly three decades, Eritrea has indeed faced a human tragedy of epic proportions where thousands were subjected to a practice of slavery and servitude, many lost their lives in wars, and a significant proportion of its population was forced to flee the country at great cost to preserve their lives. Central to all of these tragedies is the programme of national military service, and as such it is quite normal to see the issue receiving constant international coverage.

However, there appears a flawed understanding of what exactly the programme is, especially among those who report it; a misconception that appears to exist among diplomats and government officials, such as Gerd Mueller, who therefore simply propagate unrealistic hopes.

The National Service programme started in 1994 with a different proclamation from that of 1995. The first proclamation (71/94) strictly limited the period of national service to 18 months. Supported by the then dominant narrative of “liberation struggle”, it was warmly accepted by the Eritrean society without any noticeable form of resistance. But by the end of 1995, that decree had been quietly rescinded and replaced by the infamous 1995 proclamation (82/95).

By incorporating a provision known as “special obligation” (Article 21(1)), the 1995 decree subjects every adult citizen to its draconian administration, where everyone is duty bound to “serve as a volunteer” for the whole of his/her adult life. To use a more precise definition, for Eritreans the decree effectively stripped their citizenship status from them and turned them into stateless slaves.

One can thus see that the process of building an institution of forced conscription and slavery started long before the “border war” with Ethiopia, with the quiet implementation of the 1995 decree. Slowly over the years, it ensured a Master-Slave relationship in which Eritreans have effectively become the personal property of the president that can be sent to different wars and whose labour can be exploited at a whim for the benefit of the president and his loyal lieutenants. Additionally, it provides the president with a political tool that ensures effective crowd control. (One has only to refer to the list of testimonies submitted to the UN Commission of Inquiry to learn how a certain lieutenants or administrative office-bearers personally benefit from having conscripts under their command).

Parallel with the institution of slavery, a culture of terror has also been established to silence any voices and/ or to curb any actions that appear to resist the system of institutionalised slavery. This system is propagated through a network of national security agents, and a franchise of torture and imprisonment of hundreds at concentration sites countrywide.

A whole list of abuses and crimes against humanity continue to be committed under such institutions of terror and slavery. The Eritrean migrant exodus which the world has witnessed over the last decades is fundamentally a result of such inhumane practices.

We now hear Eritrean officials and international commentators suggesting the return to “statutory” terms of 18-month national service. One wonders whether this means a return to the original 1994 decree or a partial implementation of the 1995 decree? Most importantly, is that truly a solution for the tragedy?

Again, there are persist statements which indicate the economic challenges the government is facing as far as demobilisation of conscripts is concerned. For the outside world, this presents an image of a caring government that is concerned about the future of the conscripts once they are free. But for those who are going or have gone through the institutions of slavery and terror, now only too well that the president and his military commanders are worried about the loss of personal, political and economic benefits as a result of the loss of slave or conscript labour.

One may be tempted to present question to Minister Gerd Mueller and others who are propagating hopes of democratic change in Eritrea: “Why would a Master opt to free his slaves when the consequence of doing so is a loss of personal political and economic benefits? Would appeasing such a slave-master, giving tax payers’ money to him, and providing material and political incentives to that Master, help to free the slaves? Wouldn’t it be much more appropriate to support and empower the slaves to free themselves, or to support those who are fleeing persecution as refugees in Europe and elsewhere?”

In the end, it is perhaps important to recognise that the pressing political issue in Eritrea is a question of citizenship status, which can only be addressed by the introduction of a truly democratic constitutional system that guarantees the enjoyment of citizenship rights. The first step is therefore to put such a constitution in place. To put it in simple terms, the slave must be upgraded to a citizen.

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Human Rights Concern – Eritrea (HRCE)

Source=https://eritreahub.org/eritreas-promises-of-internal-reform-but-what-about-delivery